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In keeping with academia’s place as one of society’s principal sources of 
authority, it has a hard time acknowledging the value of popular culture. 
This negative attitude goes back a very long way: writing in the 1st century 
AD, Plutarch recounts the great lawmaker Solon telling a play’s author, Thes-
pis: “if we allow ourselves to praise and honour make-believe like this, the 
next thing will be to find it creeping into our serious business.”
 This is the first instance I know of popular culture producing such 
intense disquiet amongst those in power. It is not alone. The emergence of 
private, silent reading in the 9th century, which ended religion’s monopoly 
on textuality, was criticized as an invitation to idleness. And in the 12th cen-
tury, John of Salisbury warned of the negative impact of juggling, mime, and 
acting on “unoccupied minds […] pampered by the solace of some plea-
sure […] to their greater harm.” As printed books began to proliferate in 
the early 18th century, critics feared a return to the “barbarism” of the post-
Roman Empire; erudition would be overwhelmed by popular texts, just as 
it had been by war. When Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Man Werther was 
published in 1774, its hero was deemed to have caused numerous mimetic 
suicides among readers, and the book was banned in many cities.
 The extension through societies of the capacity to read had as its co-
rollary the possibility of a public that transcended people physically gathe-
red together. The obvious implication was that mass literacy could inform 
industrial and political turmoil. When unionists in the Cuban cigar indus-
try organized readings of news and current affairs to workers on the line, 
management and the state responded brutally. In the United States, slave-
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owners terrorized African-Americans who taught themselves and their co-
lleagues to read; many attributed Nat Turner’s 1831 rebellion to his literacy.
The advent of reading outdoors and the arrival of the train as a new 
site of popular culture generated anxieties about open knowledge and deba-
te. The telegraph’s capacity to spread information from the eastern states to 
19th-century Californians before they had finished breakfast was accused of 
exhausting emotional energies at the wrong time of day, while its presence 
in saloons expanded working-class betting on sporting events. Neurologi-
cal experts attributed their increased business to telegraphy, alongside the 
expansion of steam, periodical literature, science, and educated women. Ni-
neteenth-century US society saw spirited scholarly debates over whether 
new popular media and genres, such as newspapers, crime stories, and no-
vels, would breed anarchic readers lacking respect for the traditionally lite-
rate classes. They posed a threat to established élites, because they enabled 
working people to become independently minded and informed, distrac-
ting them from servitude. Anxiety about cultural imperialism also appeared, 
via Spain’s conquista de América, Portugal’s missão civilizadora, France and 
Britain’s mission civilisatrice, and Islamic debates over Western domination.
By the early 20th century, academic experts had decreed audiences of 
popular culture to be passive consumers, thanks to the missions of literary 
criticism (distinguishing the cultivated from others) and the psy-function 
(distinguishing the competent from others). The origins of social psycho-
logy can be traced to anxieties about “the crowd” in suddenly urbanized 
and educated countries that raised the prospect of a long-feared ochlocra-
cy of a worthless mob able to share popular texts. Elite theorists emerged 
from both right and left, arguing that newly literate publics were vulnera-
ble to manipulation by demagogues.
These critics were frightened of socialism, democracy, and popular 
reason. With civil society growing restive, the wealth of radical civic as-
sociations was explained away in social-psychological terms rather than 
political-economic ones, thanks to “new” scholarship. The psy-function 
warmed itself by campus fires in departments of psychology, sociology, 
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education, and communication. Scholars at Harvard took charge of the theory; 
faculty at Chicago took over the task of meeting and greeting the great un-
washed; and those at Columbia and the mid-west were responsible for 
statistical manipulation.
Such tendencies moved into high gear with the Payne Fund studies of 
the 1930s, which birthed the media-effects research we know today. They 
juxtaposed the impact of films on young college professors, male graduate 
students, their wives, and children in juvenile-correction centers. Pionee-
ring scholars set out to see whether “the onset of puberty is or is not affec-
ted by motion pictures.” The researchers asked their subjects whether “all, 
most, many, some, few, or no Chinese are cunning and underhand” and in-
vestigated cinematic “demonstrations of satisfying love techniques” to es-
tablish whether “[s]exual passions are aroused and amateur prostitution 
[…] aggravated.” Laboratory techniques used psychogalvanometers and 
wired beds with hypnographs and polygraphs.
The example of the Payne Fund studies, the development of commu-
nication studies, and the massive growth of the psy-function have led to se-
ven more decades of attempts to correlate youthful consumption of popular 
culture with anti-social conduct. Worries over popular culture’s indexical 
and incarnate power underpin a wealth of research that questions, tests, and 
measures people and their texts. Not all this work assumes a strong relation-
ship between social conduct and audience conduct, but that premise under-
pins it nevertheless.
Marxism has often viewed popular culture as a route to false conscious-
ness that diverts the working class from recognizing its economic oppres-
sion; feminist approaches have moved between condemning the popular 
as a similar distraction from gendered consciousness and celebrating it as a 
distinctive part of women’s culture; and cultural studies has regarded it as 
a key location for the symbolic resistance of class, race, and gender oppres-
sion alike.
But there has been a positive reception, as well. For some analysts, 
popular culture represents the apex of modernity. Rather than encouraging 
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alienation, it stands for the expansion of civil society, the moment in his-
tory when the state becomes receptive to, and part of, the general commu-
nity. The population is now part of the social, rather than excluded from the 
means and politics of political calculation, along with a lessening of autho-
rity, the promulgation of individual rights and respect, and a newly intense, 
interpersonal, large-scale human interaction that are necessitated by indus-
trialization and aided by systems of mass communication. The spread of 
advertising is taken as a model for the breakdown of social barriers, exem-
plified in the triumph of the popular.
Today—a moment when the Global North uses culture as a selling 
point for deindustrialized societies, and the Global South does so for ne-
ver-industrialized ones—we need a nimble, hybrid scholarly approach that 
is governed not by the old anxieties, but by a critical agenda that inquires 
cui bono—who benefits and loses from governmental and corporate ma-
neuvers around the popular, who complains about the fact, and how can 
we learn from them? 
